ECONOMIC POLICY FOR INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISM DESIGN USING COMPLEX SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTION

Рік публікації: 
2015
Збірник №: 
1

Автори:

Мова статті: 
Англійська
Нумерація сторінок: 
019-030
Аннотація: 
Abstract. Paper concerns to impact on custom receipts of duty rate changing from single to differentiated ones by customs house for foreign producers. To get maximal custom receipts for achieving of social goal state may introduce differentiated duty rates for foreign producers of unique product. Success of this state policy will depend on effectiveness of incentive compatibility conditions for these producers. Paper deals the impact of custom policy on social welfare of domestic consumers and state power for unique foreign product under incentive compatible mechanism. Obtained results show necessary to decrease duty rate for complex social choice function in comparison with budget receipt function.
Повний текст статті: 
DOI: 
10.14308/ite000492
Література: 
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